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THE CHARTER AND THE RIGHT TO LEGAL AID
Mary Jane Mossman*
'In the end the debate over the role of government
subsidy of legal aid is in some sense a debate over the
role of law and lawyers in modern society. To the
extent that courts and the legal process are viewed as
capable of performing active law reform and social
change roles, proponents of a particular ideology will
attempt to use legal aid to advance their political
vision., 1
As some commentators have suggested, the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms has created the potential for a new role for the courts in
Canadaz a role which may involve "law reform and social change"
in the context of dispute resolution. That this new role presents
challenges for judges and lawyers seems unquestioned. In addition,
however, it creates new problems for litigants, particularly those
who are poor and whose financial resources are insufficient to pay
for legal representation in the process of law reform and social
change in the courtroom.
If important ("political") decisions
affecting Canadians are to be made in courtrooms, is it appropriate
that only Canadians who can afford to pay for legal representation
should be able to participate, and that the poor should be
summarily excluded? Or does the Charter offer poor Canadians
access to the courts and the process i'Taw
reform and social
change" through a right to legal aid?
Twenty years ago, the Report of the Joint Committee 3 in Ontario
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1.

Berger, "Legal aid for the Poor: a -Conceptual Analysis"
(1982), 60 N. Car. L.R. 282 at 360.

2.

See, for example, Russell, "The Effect of A Charter of Rights
on the Policy-Making Role of Canadian Courts" (1982), 25
Can. Pub. Admin. 1.

3.

Ontario Ministry of the Attorney-General,
Joint Committee on Legal Aid (1965).

Report of the

(1985), 1 J. L. Soc. Pol.

asserted that
11... legal aid should form part of the administration of
justice in its4 broadest sense. It is no longer a charity
but a right."
The Committee recommended the establishment of a provincewide and comprehensive legal aid program funded by government. 5
However, the legislation subsequently enacted, both in Ontario 6
and then in most other Canadian provinces, 7 created only limited
rights to legal aid; and most of the legal aid statutes were designed
so as to provide legal aid only on the basis of stated eligibility
criteria. 8 By 1983, in the face of an economic recession and
governmental restraint, the Social Planning Council of Metro
Toronto concluded that the Ontario government had "shied away
from [its] commitment - substantially eroding access to legal aid."'?
The issue is whether the Charter can be used to promote access to
legal aid in Canada, and in particular whether it has potential to
extend the scope of legal aid services for low income clients
beyond the "coverage" now provided under legal aid legislation more services, more types of services, and more potential legal aid
clients. The purpose of this analysis is to sketch the outline of two
approaches to an expanded scope for legal aid services based on
Charter analysis. One approach focuses on Charter sections which
have been in effect since April 17, 1982: sections 7, 10(b), and
11(d). The other approach is based on section 15, which came into
effect on April 17, 1985. In the former case, there are some cases
already decided which have examined the Charter's provisions and
interpreted them; by contrast, the analysis of section 15 is
4.
5.
6.
7.

8.
9.

Id., at 97.
Id., at 97-98.
Now Legal Aid Act, R.S.O. 1980, c.234.
See Legal Aid Services in Canada 1979/80 (Justice
Information Report prepared by the National Legal Aid
Research Centre, Ottawa: 1981); and Legal Aid 1981
(Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Statistics Canada,
Minister of Supply and Services Canada: 1981).
For example, see Ontario's Legal Aid Act, supra note 6, at
ss.12-15.
Legal Aid in Ontario: From Rights to Charity? (2(#2) Social
Infopac, 1983) at 10.
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necessarily more speculative, although some assistance can be
obtained from existing Charter analysis, cases under the Canadian
Bill of Rights, the American experience, and protection offered by
international legal conventions. As will be apparent, the approach
to section 15 is based on an understanding of the Charter as a
radical departure in the Canadian legal system, oferi-ng more
significant protection for entrenched rights and freedoms, including that of access to justice through legal aid services.
The Sections Already in Force in 1982
a)

Sections 7 and 11(d)

These sections (sections 7, 10(b), and 11(d)) are all included as
"legal rights" in the Charter. Section 7 guarantees the right to
"life, liberty and security of the person", and the right not to be
deprived thereof "except in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice". The issue is whether, in claims which involve
"life, liberty and security of the person", it is inherent in the
principles of fundamental justice that a person should have the
benefit of legal counsel, even if the person cannot afford to pay a
lawyer. Similarly, section 11(d) provides that a person charged
with an offence has a right "to be presumed innocent until proven
guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing" by an
independent tribunal; the section requires a "fair trial". The issue
is whether, in cases where an accused is charged with an offence,
it is necessary to ensure the advice and representation of legal
counsel, even where the accused cannot afford to pay, to meet the
standard of a "fair trial".
These two sections were considered by Litsky, J. in R. v. Powell
and Powel 0 in 1984. In that case, Mr. and Mrs. Powell were
charged with two counts of truancy in relation to their children,
contrary to section 180(l) of the School Actll of Alberta. As the
judge noted, the proceedings had been adjourned a number of times
in order to permit the indigent accused to obtain counsel.
Although the accused had expressed to the Court a wish to be
represented by counsel, they had been refused legal aid by the
Legal Aid Society of Alberta; 1 2 they were represented at the
motion before Litsky, J. by a lawyer who acted for them
gratuitously.
10.
11.

(1984), 4 C.R.D. 800-01.
R.S.A. 1980, s. S-3.

12.

According to Litsky, J. the reasons for the refusal were "not
evident". Assuming that the accused were qualified on
financial criteria, it is quite possible that the refusal was due
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In interpreting section 7, Litsky, J. referred to Duke v. the
QueenJlS (a pre-Charter case) and R. v. Potma 1 4 (a 1983 decision),
both of which discussed the notion ofTi
"undamental justice". In the
latter case, Robins, J.A. stated:
"The principles or standards of fairness essential to the
attainment of fundamental justice are in no sense
static, and will continue as they have in the past to
evolve and develop in response to society's changing
perception of what is arbitrary, unfair or unjust."15
Notwithstanding his reliance on this passage as support for an
evolving idea of fundamental justice, Litsky, J. also expressed
reservations about the temptation to make "snap-analogies with
the American Bill of Rights" and declared instead that 11... we
should evolve our Charter at our own pace with our own processes
in terms of our own value systems."15 Thus, instead of relying on
the American decision in Gideon v. Wainwright, 1 7 Litsky, J.
looked to earlier Canadian decisions in interpreting section I I(d).
In R. v. MacKay, 1 8 Sinclair, C.J.Q.B., had reviewed section 11(d)
in the context of a claim to right to counsel, and stated:
"It will be observed that section 11 of the Charter deals
with the legal rights of a person charged with an
offence. Nowhere in this section does it say such a
person has the right to have counsel paid for at public
expense." 1 9
12.

13.

to the fact that a truancy charge might not be within the
category of cases for which legal aid "coverage" would
usually be provided. Note that the cost-sharing agreements
between a province and the federal government generally
specify that legal aid must be provided to indigent accused
only for indictable offences and other serious matters. See
Legal Aid 1981, supra note 7, at 17.
[19721 S.C.R. 917.

14.
15.
16.

(1983), 18 M.V.R. 133 (Ont. C.A.).
Id., at 143.
Supra note 10, Reasons for Decision, p.3.

17.

372 U.S. 335 (1963).

18.

Re MacKay and the Queen and Legal Aid Society of Alberta
(February 15, 1983).
Ibid.

19.
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However, Litsky, J. primarily relied on a pre-Charter decision to
establish the appropriate criteria to be used by a judge in deciding
whether to grant a request for legal counsel on the part of an
accused. In Re White and the Queen, 2 0 McDonald, J. had listed
six criteria for the exercise of judicial discretion in such cases,
including:
1.
2.
3.
4.

5.
6.

The financial circumstances of the accused;
The availability of a legal aid certificate;
The educational level of the accused;
The complexity of the case "in the sense of raising any
question of fact or of law as to which an accused is likely to
be at a significant disadvantage if he is unrepresented by
counsel";
The difficulty of marshalling evidence; and 2 1
The likelihood of imprisonment on conviction.

In the course of applying the criteria to this case, Litsky, J.
concluded that legal counsel should be appointed to assist Mr. and
Mrs. Powell, particularly in light of the likely defence to the
charge - a claim to the protection of section 2(2) of the Charter,
the freedom of conscience and religion.
"Such a defence will invariably involve a judicial
evaluation of religious dogma which will result in
on the part of the
commentary
emotional
accused... The Court surely cannot expect lay people
to become legal pundits navigating this case with
provocative points of fact and law into unsettled seas
Matters such as adducing
of constitutional issue.
evidence, presentation of argument, cross-examination
on evidentiary points all constitute complex procedural
processes not within the professional purview of the
Powells ... I therefore respectfully suggest that
is even more important in
appointment of counsel
22
Charter arguments."
In the opinion of Litsky, J., moreover, the complexity of the case
introduced by the Charter analysis outweighed the fact that a
conviction under the School Act would result in a fine only and not
imprisonment. In the result, Litsky, J. directed the appointment
20.

(1976), 1 Alta. L.R. 292 (Alta. S.C.).

21.

Id., at 306.

22.

Supra note 10, Reasons for Decision, p.7.
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of counsel.

23

What is significant about the accused's success in having counsel
appointed, however, is that the reasoning relies mainly on a case
involving the inherent power of a court to appoint counsel, Re
White and the Queen, rather than on an interpretation of a right'to
counsel under sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter. In this respect,
it seems that these Charter sections provide no greater right to
counsel than did the Bill of Rights. Clearly, the direction to
appoint counsel in Powell did not recognize any general right to
counsel. Ironically, it is the fact that the accused intended to
make Charter arguments by way of their defence which, using the
criteria of Re White and the Queen, resulted in the positive
decision to grant counsel to them.
The conclusion that sections 7 and 1l(d) add no new rights was also
evident in Howard v. Stony Mountain Institution. 2 4 The applicant,
an inmate of Stoney Mountain, sought an order prohibiting a
disciplinary hearing under s.39 of the Penitentiary Service
Regulations in the absence of legal counsel. The court concluded
that inmate disciplinary proceedings were administrative in nature
(and not judicial) and that they could be interfered with only in
limited types of cases. 2 5 The court noted that there is no right to
counsel at common law, and that there is authority2 6 establishing
that there is no right to counsel in such disciplinary proceedings
unless the refusal to grant counsel would breach the principles of
fairness and fundamental justice. However, the court concluded,
after an analysis of sections 7 and 11(d), that these sections do not
create any new principles of law. Further, as the disciplinary
hearing was an administrative rather than a judicial proceeding,
there was no "offence" within the meaning of section 11. As a
result, the court held that the inmate was properly denied the right
to counsel in the disciplinary proceedings, and the motion for an
order of prohibition was dismissed. In this case also, therefore, the
court relied on pre-existing law as the basis for interpreting
sections 7 and 11(d) and for the conclusion that these sections do
not create a right to counsel.
23.

24.
25.

Id., at p.9. He expressly refrained from ordering mandamus
against the Legal Aid Society of Alberta on jurisdictional
grounds, citing Legal Service Society v. Brahan Provincial
Judge (1983), 46 B.C.L.R. 32.
(1984), 4 C.R.D. 300-02, (Fed. Ct. T. D.) per Nitikman, D.J.
The court cited Martineau v. Matsqui Institution Disciplinary
Board (No. 2), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 602.
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b)

Section 10(b)

By comparison with these sections, section 10 of the Charter
focuses more specifically on the right to counsel, guaranteeing that
"on arrest or detention", everyone has a right "to retain and
instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of that right".
The issue is whether section 10(b) creates a right to legal aid.
According to the Hon. Jean Chretien, then Minister of Justice, at
the time of the Joint Committee hearings on the Charter, the
section had no such effect. The interchange was as follows:
"Mr. Robinson: ... I am sure you would recognize that
without adequate funds that this right is a hollow right.
Do you envisage this possibly being interpreted by the
courts as including the right to legal aid in the case of
serious offences, or would that have to be spelled out
explicitly?"
"Mr. Chretien: No. You have the right to retain and
instruct counsel. That is the right he has. How to
retain and compensate the counsel is to be decided by
the person involved and his lawyer and there are some
programs that are shared costs where, for certain
categories of citizens, because he cannot afford it, he
receives legal aid from the provincial administration.
So the question of compensation, the legal adviser is
not a matter of right. It is a question of a private
citizen dealing with society with his own problem.
Legal aid is a social measure that exists in Canada and
is available under the criteria that are 2established
by
7
the Attorney-Generals of the provinces."
The former Justice Minister's comments are not, of course,
determinative of the issue; they merely confirm the expected
interpretation of section 10(b) on the part of the federal
government at the time the Charter was being negotiated. At the
same time, it is evident thatidiffrent wording was adopted for
section 10(b) by contrast with section 14; the latter section of the
Charter guarantees the "right to the assistance of an interpreter
26.

27.

The court cited Blanchard and Disciplinary Board of
Millhaven Institution and Hardtman (1982), 69 C.C.C. (2d)
171.
Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Special Joint
Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons on
the Constitution of Canada (1980-81) 46:125 (January 27,
1981).
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for a party or witness who does not speak the language of the
According to at least one
proceedings or who is deaf".
commentator, the wording of section 14 requires that:
"The interpreter should probably be paid for out of
public funds, at least for a party or witness who cannot
to
afford to pay the cost himself (compare
2 8 the right
retain and instruct counsel in s. 10(b))."
On the other hand, section 10(b) may be used as a basis for a right
to legal aid, at least in the context of a person who is arrested or
detained. The right in section 10(b) is stated affirmatively, 2 9 by
contrast with section 2(c)(ii) of the Canadian Bill of Rights which
states only that no law of Canada should be construed or applied
"so as to deprive a person who has been arrested or detained of the
right to retain and instruct counsel without delay." In Re Ewing
and Kearney and the Queen, 30 the court held that the wording of
the Bill of Rights did not create a right to legal counsel at public
expense. In that case, the two accused (both aged 18) were
charged with possession of narcotics. They had no money to hire
counsel but were refused legal aid on the ground that their
convictions would not likely result in imprisonment or loss of
livelihood. At trial, a motion for prohibition was argued on their
behalf and denied. In the appeal to the British Columbia Court of
Appeal, three judges held that the appeal should be dismissed and
two judges dissented. As Seaton, J.A., for the majority, declared:
"The essential difficulty in the appellants' position is
that these provisions of the Bill of Rights prevent a law
being construed so as to deprive the accused of the
right to counsel, but do not provide that a law3 shall
be
construed so as to bestow the right to counsel." 1
Quoting R. v. Burnshine 3 2 in the Supreme Court of Canada, Seaton,
J.A. declared that section 2 of the Bill of Rights "did not create
new rights. Its purpose was to prevent infringement of existing
rights". 3 If the purpose of the Bill of Rights was only to declare
existing rights, however, it may be arguable that section 10(b)
28.

Hogg, Canada Act, 1982 Annotated (Carswell: 1982) at 49.

29.
30.

Id. at 35.
(1974), 49 D.L.R. (3d) 619, (B.C.C.A.).

31.
32.

Ibid.
T1-974), 15 C.C.C. (2d) 505, 44 D.L.R. (3d) 584, 25 C.R.N.S.
270.
(1974), 15 C.C.C. (2d) 505 at 513, 44 D.L.R. (3d) 584 at 592.

33.
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provides a more extensive guarantee of the right to counsel,
including the right to legal aid for those without the means to
purchase legal services. The more affirmative wording of the right
in section l0b) of the Charter is consistent with such an
interpretation." 4
This conclusion would also be consistent with some of the
American cases 3 5 referred to in Ewing and with the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which provides for a right to
legal assistance "without payment" by a person charged "if he does
not have sufficient means to pay for it". 3 6 It is also consistent
with the reasoning of the two dissenting judges in the British
Columbia Court of Appeal who relied on the need for counsel in
order to ensure that an accused has a fair trial. 3 7 As Farris, CJBC
stated:
"Simply stated, it is my opinion that:
(1) An accused person is entitled to a fair trial
(2) He cannot be assured of a fair trial without the
assistance of counsel.
(3) If, owing to the lack of funds, he cannot obtain
counsel, the State has an obligation to provide
one." 3 8
This statement clearly links the need for counsel to the objective
of a fair trial, and it is at least arguable that section 10(b) could be
read in conjunction with section 11(d) to reach a conclusion similar
to that of the dissenting judges in Ewing. Certainly, there appears
to be nothing in the Charter to prevent such a conclusion from
being drawn as a result of reading the two sections together in this
way.
34.
35.

36.
37.

38.

Hogg, supra note 28, at 35.
Generally, Powell v. Alabama 287 U.S. 45 (1932) and Gideon
v. Wainwright 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See also Argersinger v.
Hamlin 407 U.S. 25 (1972) and Hogg, supra note 28 at 34-35.
Covenant, article 14(3)(d).
Farris, C.J.B.C., dissenting, relied on cases in which a new
trail was ordered because the accused had been
unrepresented at trial, calling into question whether the trial
had been a fair one: R. v. Johnson (1973), 11 C.C.C. (2d) 101,
21 C.R.N.S. 375, (1973] 3 W.W.R. 513; R. v. Butler (1973), 11
C.C.C. (2d) 381; Veseio v. The King [1949], 92 C.C.C. 161;
(1949) 1 D.L.R. 720; 11949] S.C.R. 139.
Supra, note 30 at 623.
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Further support for such an interpretation can also be drawn from
the majority decision and its focus on the negative wording of the
right to counsel provision in the Bill of Rights. The affirmative
wording of the Charter provision, in contrast to that of the Bill of
Rights, seems quite consistent with the idea that counsel may be
necessary to achieve the Charter guarantee of a fair trial under
section 11(d). These differences may be significant enough to
distinguish the result in Ewing.
However, even if these arguments were successful, it is important
to note that the guarantee of a right to counsel in section 10(b) is
limited to persons who are arrested or detained; it is thus available
essentially in matters of criminal law, and seems designed for the
purpose of providing legal representation in those circumstances and not for other types of cases or to provide other kinds of legal
On this basis, the
services such as advice or information.
guarantee of section 10(b) may extend legal aid services in Canada
only very little beyond the provisions of legal aid legislation (which
already usually provides for legal aid to clients charged with
indictable offences); it is possible, of course, that a right to
counsel guarantee would extend legal aid services to some persons
charged with only summary conviction offences and to whom legal
aid may now be routinely denied. However, the section 10(b) right
to counsel cannot 3 rovide a basis for broadly-based legal aid
services as of right.
Section 15: The Equality Guarantee and Access to Justice
Section 15 of the Charter offers a new departure in Canadian
political life. 4 0 This section offers the protection of equality
"before and under the law" as well as "equal protection and equal
benefit of the law"; moreover, the protection is offered "without
discrimination based on
discrimination", and in particular, without
41
listed grounds such as race and sex.
39.

40.

There have been many cases to date interpreting section
10(b) in the context of prompt and proper notice about an
accused's right to counsel, especially in relation to
breathalyzer tests. See R. v. Currie (1983), 4 C.C.C. (3d) 217
(N.S.C.A.); R. v. Jackie (1983), 22 M.V.R. 84 (Sask. Q.B.); R.
v. Rahn (1984), 11 C.C.C. (3d( 152 (Alta. C.A.); R. v.
Anderson (1983), 19 M.V.R. 33 (Ont. co.Ct.).
Russell, supra note 2, at 26 states his concern about the
potential for change to be created by section 15:
"I would be much happier about section 15 if its
adoption as part of the law of our constitution had
followed a widespread public and parliamentary
discussion about the principles and practice of
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The issue here is whether the equality guarantees in section 15
mean that all citizens must be provided with legal counsel, if
necessary at public expense, in order to meet the commitment of
"equality before and under the law" and more particularly, the
law's "equal protection and equal benefit". This issue requires an
examination of the meaning of the guarantee of section 15.
The interpretation of section 15 depends on underlying assumptions
about its intended purpose - was it intended to codify existing
rights or was it intended to effect some (substantial?) societal
change? 4 2 As the only section of the Charter not proclaimed in
force in 1982 and the only section subjected to a three-year delay
to permit governments to review legislation so as to bring it into
conformity, it seems very clear that section 15 was expected to
effect some changes in legislation. 4 3 Assuming that section 15
was intended to effect legal and societal changes in Canada,
however, it is still necessary to determine the scope of the equality
guarantee. In this task, it seems useful to consider the American
equality. But that is not the case... The public
and legislative discussions concerning it provide
little guidance to our judges as to how far or how
fast it is desirable to eliminate all forms of
discrimination in Canadian society. Leaving these
matters to our judges may have the unfortuante
consequence of relieving ourselves as citizens from
the responsibility of reasoning together about
acceptable answers to these questions of social
justice..."
41. The full list set out in section 15 includes "race, national or
ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical
disability".
42. For an assessment of the role of section 15, see Hogg, supra
note 28, at 50 ff; Gold, "A Principled Approach to Equality
Rights: A Preliminary Inquiry" (1982), 4 Sup. Ct. L.R. 131;
Tarnopolsky and Beaudoin, ed., The Charter of Rights:
Commentary (Butterworths, 1982); and Lyon, The Charter as
a Mandate for New Ways of Thinking About Law [1984]
Queen's L.J. 241.
43. In January, 1985, the federal government finally issued a
A
preliminary paper Equality Issues in Federal Law:
Shortly thereafter, the Ontario
Discussion Paper (1985).
Ministry of the Attorney-General released its study, Sources
of the Interpretation of Equality Rights Under the Charter:
Neither paper makes
A Background Paper (Jan. 1985).
recommendations, and it seems evident that few, if any,
legislative changes have occurred during the three year
period 1982-85.
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jurisprudence, the Bill of Rights and international legal
protections, always bearing in mind that section 15 represents a
unique departure in Canadian law.
The American Jurisprudence

a)

The "equal protection" analysis of the 14th amendment offers some
useful approaches to interpreting section 15 of the Charter. The
U.S. cases must be understood in the context of ade-bate about
whether the equal protection guarantee provided a substantive
guarantee or merely a procedural one. The idea that it was a
substantive guarantee seems to have begun in 1956 in Griffin v.
Iinois, 4 4 a case which required that the states provide transcripts
of trial free-of-charge to indigent criminal appellants. This case
was followed, especially during the years of the Warren Court, by
others such as Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.45 which declared
unconstitutional a wage garnishment scheme by ex parte order
46
(because of its effect on indigent citizens); Fuentes v. Shevin
which declared unconstitutional the summary procedures for
repossession of goods; Goldberg v. Kelly 4 7 which declared
unconstitutional the termination of welfare benefits without a
hearing; and Boddie v. Connecticut 4 8 which declared that it was a
violation of due process (the 5th amendment) for welfare recipients
to be excluded from the court process because they could not
afford the $60,000 filing fees. 4 9 All of these cases, although
somewhat procedural in their focus, created substantive protection
for the poor. By the end of the 1970's it seemed likely that the
U.S. Supreme Court would enunciate a:
"... formal recognition of the principle that economic
44.
45.
46.
47.

351
395
407
397

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

12 (1956).
337 (1969).
67 (1972).
254 (1970).

48.

401 U.S. 371 (1971).

49.

See also Smuck v. Hansen 393 U.S. 801 (1969); Douglas v.
California 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Diaper v. Washington 372 U.S.
487 (1963); Land v. Brown 372 U.S. 477 (1963); Anders v.
California 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Ross v. Moffitt 417 U.S. 600
r174
apiro . Thomson 394 U.S. 618 (1969); King v.
Smith 392 U.S. 309 (1968); and Holloway, The Rich and the
Poor in Supreme Court History (Paradigm Press, California
1982).
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subsistence benefits [were] a fundamental right and
that poverty as a classification [was] legally suspect,
thus making the denial of benefits a matter of 'strict
scrutiny'..560
The development of the idea of substantive protection for
economic equality was, however, subsequently curtailed in
decisions such as James v. Valtierra 5 l and San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez.0 In these and other cases,00 the
U.S.
Supreme Court effectively restricted the idea of equal
protection as a guarantee of substantive rights for the poor.
On the other hand, the American cases have consistently upheld a
right of access to legal counsel, a procedural guarantee of equal
protection. In an early case, Powell v. Alabama, 54 the U.S.
Supreme Court reviewed the history of the right to counsel, noting
that such a right had existed at common law in England for petty
crime. On the facts, the court held that the right to have counsel
appointed
was the logical corollary of the constitutional right to be
55
heard.

50.

51.

52.

53.

Galloway, supra note 49, at 161, referring to Shapiro v.
Thomon,supra note 49 and Hunter v. Erickson 394 U.S. 385
(1969). See also Michelman, "On Protecting the Poor Through
the Fourteenth Amendment" (1969), 83 Harv. L.R. 7.
402 U.S. 137 (1971). The statute under review required that a
majority of voters at a community election approve a lowrent housing project for the area before it could be built; a
challenge to the statute's validity by a group of low-income
residents (eligible for the housing) was dismissed.
411 U.S. 1 (1973). The court found an education statute
constitutional even though it resulted in very unequal funding
for schools in rich, by comparison with poor, neighbourhoods.
See also Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corporation 97 U.S. 555 (1977).
See Mathews v. Eldrid e 424 U.S. 319 (1976); United States v.
Kras 409 U.S. 434 (1973); Ortwein v..chwab 410 U.S. 656
(1973).
See also Binion, "The Disadvantaged Before the
Burger Court" (1982), 4 Law and Policy Q. 37.

54.

287 U.S. 45 (1932).

55.

Id.,at 7l.
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"In a capital case, where the defendant is unable to
employ counsel, and is incapable adequately of making
his own defence because of ignorance, feeblemindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the
court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel56for
him as a necessary requisite of due process of law."
More recently, in Gideon v. Wainwright 5 7 in 1963, the court
reconsidered Powell v. Alabama and the role of the federal
constitutional right to counsel (the 6th amendment) in state courts.
In Gideon, the court concluded that the capital/non-capital
distinction relating to the right to counsel was not appropriate, and
that the 14th amendment required due process for the deprivation
of liberty as for the deprivation of life. 5 8 Still later, in Argersinger
v. Hamlin 5 9 in 1972, the constitutional right to counsel was
extended further to "petty offences". In reviewing the scope of the
6th amendment, Douglas, J. stated:
...there is nothing in the language of the
Amendment, its history, or in the decisions of this
Court, to indicate that it was intended to embody a
retraction of the right in petty offences wherein the
common law
previously did require that counsel be
60
provided."
Moreover, in the judgments of both Douglas, J. and Brennan, J.,
there is a reference to the need for counsel in order to ensure a
fair trial, even in a case involving only a "petty offence". In
Argersinger, the offence was punishable by imprisonment for up to
six months, a $1,000 fine, or both.
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372 U.S. 335 (1963).
The court's analysis focussed especially on Betts v. Brady 316
U.S. 455 (1942), an earlier decision but similar on its facts to
Gideon; the result of the decision in Gideon was to overturn
Betts v.Brady. See also Kinsella v. United States 361 U.S.
234 (1960); Grosjean v. American Press Co. 297 U.S. 233
(1936); Johnson v. Zerbst 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Avery v.
Alabama 308 U.S. 444 (1940); and Smith v. O'Grady 312 U.S.
329 (1941).
407 U.S. 25 (1972). See also Scott v. Illinois 440 U.S. 367
(1979) and Meitz (1980), 56 N.D.L. Rev. 433; In Re Gualt 387
U.S. 1 (1967); Miranda v. Arizona 384 U.S. 436(966)T.
Argersinger, id., at 30.

The Charter and the Right to Legal Aid
These cases demonstrate a continuing commitment to the right to
counsel, and an increasing scope for its application in recent cases.
The scope of the right has been extended to some extent to civil
cases as well. In Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Services, 6 1 the court
considered the question of a right of counsel in a case where the
termination of parental status was at stake. The court listed three
factors to be weighed to determine the right to counsel issue: the
private interest at stake, the government interest in the matter,
and the risk that the proceedings would lead to an erroneous
decision. On the facts of Lassiter, the right to counsel was denied,
but the need for a careful assessment of the facts in each case was
emphasized. The practical reality of scarce legal aid funding was
also addressed in Wolff v. Ruddy. 6 2
In that case the court
considered whether the right to counsel could be denied because of
a lack of funding. Recognizing that the court has no control over
the "public purse", the court nonetheless concluded that if no
funding is available and a public defender requires some funds to be
able to proceed, the accused would be entitled to be discharged
rather than being prosecuted without the benefit of a right to
counsel.
These cases demonstrate clearly the extent to which the right to
counsel has been provided in equal protection analysis in the U.S.
While it appears that the equal protection analysis has sometimes
been linked to the 6th amendment (the right to counsel) in the
reasoning of the American courts, there is, of course, nothing to
prevent a Canadian court from creating a similar link between
section 15 (equal protection) and sections 10(b) (right to counsel)
and 11(d) (fair trial) to provide a guarantee of legal counsel, at
least in cases where an accused is "arrested or detained" pursuant
to section 10(b).
A similar link between section 15's equal
protection and the protection for liberty in section 7 would further
support a right to counsel, perhaps in civil as well as criminal
cases. This latter position must surely be enhanced as well by the
phrase "equal benefit of the law" in the Canadian Charter, a phrase
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which does not appear in the American consitution, but which
arguably requires the intervention of legal assistance to meet such
a goal. It is difficult to imagine how a litigant can be assured of
the equal benefit of the law in the absence of even minimal
procedural protection such as the right to counsel. On this basis,
the American cases appear to offer some useful approaches for the
analysis of section 15. However, it is arguable that the Charter's
guarantees extend farther, at least in terms of the right to counsel,
than the scope of the American equal protection analysis evident
to date. Thus while the cases from U.S. courts may be helpful in
arguments about the right to legal aid, it is important to avoid
introducing into the analysis of section 15 of the Charter any
unnecessary or inappropriate restrictions on its equality guarantee.
b)

The Canadian Bill of Rights

The Canadian Bill of Rights provides in s. l(b) that "there have
existed and shall continue to exist in Canada" listed human rights
and freedoms, namely, "the right of the individual to equality
before the law and the protection of the law". The meaning of
these words has been considered by courts on a number of
occasions. 6 3
Essentially, the meaning ascribed to the words
"equality before the law" has been a narrow one:
"... [it) carries the meaning of equal subjection of all
classes to the ordinary law of the land as administered
by the ordinary Courts, and in my opinion the phrase
"equality before the law" as employed in s. 1(b) of the
Bill of Rights is to be treated as meaning equality in
the administration or application of the law by the law
enforcement authorities and the ordinary Courts of the
land." 64
The courts have not often considered the meaning of the phrase
"protection of the law", although an obiter opinion was expressed in
R. v. Mackay65 that the phrase shoi-W-iarry a meaning of "equal
protection".
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In light of the restrictive interpretation of the phrase "equality
before the law", the argument that the phrase "equal under the
law" is an effort to expand the scope of its protection is a
compelling one; it has been suggested that the concept of equality
under the law:
",... was intended to ensure that judicial review
extended to the content of the law, and not
just to the
67
manner in which the law is administered".
It is arguable, therefore, that the additional phrase might lend
credibility to an argument that the equality guarantee requires
access to legal aid for low-income clients.
Similarly, the phrase "equal protection" adds a new dimension by
comparison with the wording of the Bill of Rights. And, finally,
the Charter adds the words "equal benefit", which nowhere
appearedin the Bill of Rights and which have no equivalent in the
U.S. Constitution. On this basis, it seems that the inevitable
conclusion must be drawn that a significant expansion of the scope
of equality rights was intended.
This conclusion is significant in the context of the Ewin case, 6 8
referred to in connection with section 10(b). In that decision,
Seaton, J.A. (for the majority) denied that section l(b) of the Bill
of Rights created new rights. He quoted from the opinion of
Martland, J. in R. v. Burnshine:
"I am not prepared to accept the respondent's
submission as to the meaning of the phrase 'equality
before the law' in s. 1(b) of the Canadian Bill of Rights.
Section 1 of the Bill declared that six defined human
rights and freedoms 'have existed' and that they should
'continue to exist'. All of them had existed and were
protected under the common law. The Bill
did not
purport to define new rights and freedoms." 6 9
On this basis, Seaton, J.A. concluded that the appellants'
contention "that to be unrepresented would constitute
discrimination by reason of impecuniosity" was unpersuasive since
it involved creating a new right. If, however, the new phrases
added to section 15 of the Charter have significance, it is arguable
67.
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that the position taken by Seaton, J.A. in Ewing will need to be
reassessed. Both the additions to the wording and the three-year
delay in proclaiming section 15 bespeak an intention to add to
equality rights under the Charter. On this basis, the limited scope
of s. 1(b) of the Canadian Bill of Rights, as determined in the cases
interpreting it, should not be used to confine the interpretation of
section 15 in terms of a right to legal aid.
c)

International Legal Protections

Canada became a party to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and its Optional Protocol in 1976. A number of
provisions of the Covenant bear similarity to the wording of
sections of the Charter, including provisions on equality and on the
right to counsel.U Ar--ticle 14(3) of the Covenant provides a right
to legal assistance in any case where the interests of justice so
require, and without payment by the person charged "if he does not
have sufficient means to pay for it". While this section appears to
be confined to persons "charged", it nonetheless might create a
right to legal aid in a wider range of situations than those presently
covered in Canada. Failure to comply with Covenant guarantees
means that Canada is in breach of its international obligations. 7 1
There is a similar provision in Article 6.1 of the European
Convention on Human Rights which reads in part:
"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations
or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is
entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable
time by an independent and impartial tribunal
established by law."
Although the Convention does not guarantee any right to free legal
aid as such, the Airey Case 7 2 of 1979 decided that article 6:
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"1... may sometimes compel the state to provide for the

assistance of a lawyer when such assistance proves
indispensable for effective access to court either because
reason
legal representation is rendered compulsory... or7 by
3
of the complexity of the procedure or of the case."
In Airey, legal assistance was ordered on behalf of a woman
applying for a legal separation in Ireland, where such a degree can
be obtained only from the high court. The procedure was admitted
74
to be complex, and there was no legal aid in Ireland at the time.
Although the European Convention is not binding on Canada, the
decisions of the European Court may nonetheless be useful
reference points for analyzing the meaning of the Charter's
provisions. As has been suggested,

"[A judicious use of international human rights law, in
combination with comparative analysis of the
jurisprudence of other culturally similar countries, can
help to supplement and confirm domestic sources of
inspiration that may range from pre-existing case law
to basic concepts of political philosophy. The result
will be not only to ensure that Canada complies with its
international obligations, but also to improve the
quality 7of
the interpretation of the Charter by our
courts." 5
d)

Conclusions About Equality

This analysis has tried to demonstrate that the language of section
15 exceeds the scope of the 14th amendment and equal protection
analysis in the U.S., as well as the jurisprudence in Canada under
the Canadian Bill of Rights. It has also briefly examined the
international protections as a way of comparing the nature of the
Charter's guarantees. All of this analysis reinforces a conception
of section 15 as a purposive and significant development in the
Canadian legal system, as was suggested at the beginning of this
examination of section 15. Moreover, the idea that right to legal
aid is inherent in the section 15 equality guarantee is consistent
with the philosophical notion of equality before and under the law
and its equal protection and benefit:
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'"rhe justification for access rights [rights to legal aid]
derives from an analysis of the role of courts and the
legal system in society. In the modern state, the legal
system provides a 'general normative code' performing
integrative functions in the social system by use of
formal dispute resolution mechanisms... As members
of society, individuals are entitled to effective access
to the law. Legal aid is a means of providing
such
76
access to those who cannot otherwise afford it."
A Note on the Scope of Section 1
If these principles are used to determine that the equality section
(or other sections of the Charter) create a right to legal aid, it is
likely that provincial legal aid legislation, which restricts
entitlement to legal aid services, will be held to violate the rights
and freedoms guaranteed. However, to be rendered void, it will be
necessary not only to have a violation of a Charter guarantee but
also to demonstrate that the guarantee is not limited by section 1.
This means that a provincial statute which limits legal aid services
may nonetheless be valid if its limits constitute "such reasonable
limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free
and democratic society". Cases which have interpreted section 177
have held that it creates an affirmative obligation on government
to clearly demonstrate why the law is a reasonable limit even
78
though it violates a right or freedom guaranteed by the Charter.
It is possible that the interpretation of section 1 will also be
assisted by American and international jurisprudence. 7 9 However,
it seems at least arguable that section 1 will not operate so8 0as to
limit the right to legal aid created by the equality guarantee.
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Conclusion
This overview of approaches to analyzing Charter rights and
freedoms to assess the support they offer for a right to legal aid
has suggested potential arguments favouring the existence of such
a right either under the sections proclaimed in force in April 1982,
or pursuant to section 15, effective from April 17, 1985. In
addition, it is important not to overlook the possibility of linking
the equality guarantee in section 15 to other rights and freedoms
such as the right to counsel in section 10(b). In either case, of
course, the analysis is subject to section 1. And overall, the
analysis depends on an underlying assumption that the Charter,
especially section 15, is intended to effect legal change in Ca-nada.
In this context, the existence of a right to legal aid seems quite
consistent. As one commentator has explained:
"Only through recourse to state-approved adjudication
can citizens ensure themselves of the full protection of
the law. Because individuals living in our society must
exchange recourse to self help for police and judicial
protection, they should be provided the opportunity to
use the courts effectively to resolve disputes... The
rules of law governing the modern state are so complex
that lawyers are required to interpret legal rules for
indigents to determine if a valid claim exists and t9
aid
them in navigating the shoals of the legal system.1 8
To do so effectively, the poor must have a right to legal aid. The
Charter promises much; the challenge is to keep the promise!
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